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The anticipated and concurring effects of EMU: 
exchange rate volatility, institutions and growth 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 15/2004 





Reduced exchange rate volatility and higher and less heterogeneous quality of 
institutional rules and macroeconomic policies are two of the main (anticipated 
and concurring) effects expected from a currency union. 
  In this paper we measure the magnitude of these two effects on the Euro area 
countries, looking at real effective exchange rates (REER) and at different 
indicators of quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies (QIRMP). 
We find that the first effect is much stronger than the second when we compare 
relative changes on Euro area countries and the rest of the world in the relevant 
period. 
  We further evaluate the impact of both effects on economic growth on a larger 
sample of countries. Our findings show that both have significant impact on levels 
(more robust) and on rates of growth (weaker) of per capita GDP. 
 
Key words: real exchange rate, volatility, institutional rules, macroeconomic 
policy 
 
JEL classification numbers: F15, F31  
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Euroopan rahaliiton vaikutukset 
valuuttakurssivaihteluun, instituutioihin ja 
taloudelliseen kasvuun 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 15/2004 





Vakaa valuuttakurssi sekä aiempaa yhtenäisempi talouspolitiikka ja institutionaa-
linen säännöstö ovat ne kaksi keskeistä vaikutusta, joita rahaliitolta tavanomaisesti 
odotetaan. Tässä tutkimuksessa näiden kahden vaikutuksen voimakkuutta Euro-
euroalueella arvioidaan yhtäältä tutkimalla reaalisen efektiivisen valuuttakurssin 
(REER) käyttäytymistä ja toisaalta tulkitsemalla erilaisia talouspolitiikan ja insti-
tutionaalisten sääntöjen laatua (QIRMP) mittaavia indikaattoreita. Tulosten mu-
kaan ensimmäinen näistä vaikutuksista on paljon voimakkaampi kuin jälkimmäi-
nen, kun verrataan euroalueen maiden välisiä reaalisen valuuttakurssin muutoksia 
vertailuryhmään kuuluvien maiden vastaaviin. 
  Tutkimuksessa myös arvioidaan näiden tekijöiden vaikutusta taloudelliseen 
kasvuun laajemmasta maajoukosta koostuvassa aineistossa. Tulosten mukaan 
reaalisen valuuttakurssin stabiloituminen ja talouspolitiikan yhdenmukaistuminen 
kasvattavat henkeä kohden laskettua bruttokansantuotetta ja nopeuttavat sen 
kasvuvauhtia. Näistä jälkimmäinen tulos on kuitenkin enemmän riippuvainen 
mittaustavasta. 
 
Avainsanat: reaalinen valuuttakurssi, heilahtelut, institutionaaliset säännöt, talous-
politiikka 
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A nice synthesis of the challenges posed by global integration is in the 
formulation of a well known trilemma (Summers, 1999). The trilemma 
synthetically expresses the difficulties, or the impossibility, of pursuing at the 
same time the following three goals – greater economic integration, proper public 
policy management and national sovereignty – against the possibility of pursuing 
any of the two at the expenses of the third. The three potential alternatives left for 
the partial solution of the trilemma are resumed as being those of: i) ‘traditional 
conservative economists’ (according to Summers definition) pursuing economic 
integration and national sovereignty at the expenses of freedom on public policy 
management; ii) modern protectionists advocating limits to economic integration 
to favor ‘free hands’ on public policy management and national sovereignty and, 
finally, iii) advocates of Monetary Unions intended as means to promote 
economic integration and proper public policy management at the expense of 
national sovereignty (Summers, 1999). 
  In this perspective the rise of Monetary Unions appears therefore as one of the 
possible responses to the trilemma which makes compatible the first two goals at 
the expense of the third. 
  Originally, within the more general approach of the optimal currency areas 
(Mundell, 1961), one of the most sound economic rationales for the EMU came 
from the theoretical observation that simple fixed exchange rate parities could not 
be enough for the partial solution of the trilemma given that, in absence of a 
common currency, exchange rate stability cannot coexist with divergences in 
fiscal and monetary policies (Giavazzi and Pagano 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995). In this framework a country whose monetary policy is relatively more 
expansionary than that of the fixed exchange rate partner is likely to suffer from 
an appreciation of real exchange rates. This appreciation worsens its relative 
competitiveness and therefore makes necessary a devaluation, thereby generating 
further currency instability. The awareness of such problems led economist and 
policymakers in the eighties and in the nineties to affirm that ‘fixed exchange 
rates now seem much less effective as means to price stability than many of us 
thought before. Therefore, monetary stability and credibility has to be built at 
home with other means’ (Svensson 1994, p. 467). 
  On the basis of this theoretical pillar, the EU started a process of convergence 
in fiscal policies, inflation and institutions which was going to prepare the 
introduction of a common currency. 
  One of the undiscussed advantages of the process leading to the common 
currency was the elimination of exchange rate volatility among members (Buiter 
et al 1998, Devereux et al 1998). This was generally considered a beneficial effect 
given the perception that ‘unpredictable volatility can inflict damage’ ...[and  
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that]… ’Although the associated costs have not been quantified rigorously, many 
economists believe that exchange rate uncertainty reduces international trade, 
discourages investment and compounds the problems people face in insuring their 
human capital in incomplete asset markets.’ (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). 
  Since exchange rates are a forward looking financial variable whose 
movements are driven by expectations and anticipate the occurrence of real 
events, the most, if not all the positive effects of the process of convergence 
toward the common currency in terms of real exchange rate volatility materialized 
well before that event.
1 This fact may create the illusion that the introduction of 
the common currency did not generate any benefit. 
  A deeper look at the institutional background may help to illustrate the point 
of the strict consequentiality between policy and institutional changes promoted 
by the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact and the stage of the single 
currency. On a chronological point of view, consider that, even though the Euro 
was technically born on December 31, 1998, it had a eight-year gestation which 
closely followed the time-table and modalities agreed upon in December 1991 in 
Maastricht (Corsetti and Pesenti 1999). The Maastricht Treaty, and, subsequently, 
the Stability and Growth Pact, established prerequisites needed to qualify for MU 
membership  which include complying with the convergence criteria in terms of 
inflation, fiscal stance and interest rates, as well as appropriate reforms to prepare 
central banks to be integrated into the new European system.
2 More specifically 
on this point, Gali and Perotti (2003) remember that compliance with budgetary 
discipline (established by art. 104 of the Treaty) and price stability was among the 
criteria on which the decision of admission to stage III of the EMU was taken in 
July 1998. Furthermore, the same EEC rules explicitly exclude the same 
consequentiality for countries which are not candidates to the Monetary Union. 
Regulation 1467/97 states that fiscal discipline does not apply to the UK unless it 
moves to the stage of Monetary Union. Both Denmark and the UK are explicitly 
exempted from requirements of paragraph 9 and 11 of Art. 104 relative to 
European Council penalties for countries with deficit exceeding the 3% threshold 
(Gali and Perotti 2003). 
                                                 
1 Van Foreest and de Vries (2002) provide results in support of this hypothesis linking relate 
exchange rate instability to the instability of macroeconomic policies. The authors show that, 
irrespective of the foreign exchange rate regime, countries with high monetary volatility have 
lower relative output growth. The interpretation is that, due to the forward looking nature of 
foreign exchange markets, exchange rate stability hinges on the stability of the institutional 
structure within which monetary and fiscal policies are formulated. 
2 Dwyer and Lothian (2003) and Afxentiou (2000) argue that convergence criteria created 
conditions for a change in monetary and inflation environments which greatly reduced the 
skepticism toward the Euro, emphasising another important link between convergence and Euro 
adoption.  
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  Based on this evidence, it is hard to believe ex post that a process of 
institutional and monetary and fiscal policy convergence would have occurred 
without the final goal of the MU. 
  This is why we argue in this paper that the likely benefits of a common 
currency must be evaluated starting from the beginning of the convergence 
process leading to the Euro. Our approach for measuring them is in two steps. In 
the first we compare real effective exchange rate volatility and, level and variance 
of QIRMP between Eurozone members and other representative groups of 
countries before and after the currency union. In the second we evaluate the 
impact of these variables on economic growth. 
  The paper is divided into six sections (including introduction and 
conclusions). In the second section we shortly illustrate theoretical and empirical 
arguments of the literature on the relationship between exchange rate volatility 
and growth. In the third section we describe the approach followed to build a real 
effective exchange rate (REER) risk indicators in order to measure the effects of 
convergence toward the Euro on exchange rate volatility. In the fourth and fifth 
section we respectively describe our econometric specification and present 
findings which evaluate the statistical and economic impact of REER volatility 




2  The relationship between REER and growth 
The main channel though which volatility is expected to affect growth is 
investment but theoretical evidence on the relationship between investment and 
volatility is mixed (Caballero and Corbo 1989. Baum et al 2001, Froot and 
Kemplerer 1989, Serven 2000). Theoretical predictions on the relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and investment depend on assumptions on 
market competitiveness, symmetry/asymmetry of investment adjustment costs and 
entrepreneurial attitudes toward risk. 
  Cavallero and Corbo, (1989) predict a positive effect of volatility on 
investment under perfect competition, risk neutrality and symmetric costs of 
capital adjustment. The positive effect arises from the convexity of the profit 
function implying that potential losses for insufficient investment in good states 
are higher than potential costs for excess capacity in bad states and therefore lead 
firms to overinvest when the exchange rate volatility is higher. 
  This result, though, disappears under more realistic assumptions such as the 
departure from risk neutrality and symmetric costs of capital adjustment. The 
existence of sunk costs implies per se that costs of downward are higher than 
those of upward adjustments (Dixit and Pindick 1994). Serven (2000) shows that  
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irreversibility must be accompanied by imperfect competition and decreasing 
returns to scale to change the sign (from positive to negative) of the relationship 
among uncertainty, investment and growth. The direction of the link between 
investment and volatility definitely changes (and becomes negative) if we also 
introduce risk aversion. 
  Theoretical papers analyzing the direct relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and growth find mixed results. Baum et al (2001) use a signal extraction 
framework to investigate the effects of permanent and transitory components of 
exchange rates on firms’ profitability under imperfect information. They find that 
the variances of these components have indeterminate effects on profits growth, 
but predictable effects on its volatility. Froot and Kemplerer (1989) observe in an 
oligopolistic framework that, when market shares matter, exchange rate volatility 
may affect price and quantity of trade in both directions, regardless of risk 
preferences. 
  More clear evidence is provided on the empirical side by Serven (2000) who 
finds that a GARCH-based measure of real exchange rate volatility has a strong 
negative impact on investment, larger in countries with highly open economies 
and less developed financial systems.
3 
  On the methodological side, the empirical research on the relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and growth has followed different 
methodological paths: bilateral exchange rate volatility, ARCH–modeled 
volatility, real effective exchange rate volatility and volatility of the exchange rate 
misalignment with respect to a ‘fundamental’ value (Razin and Collins 1997). 
  Empirical findings seem consistent with the above mentioned theoretical 
approach which considers the role of asymmetric sunk costs and finds a negative 
relationship among exchange rate volatility, investment and growth (Cottani et al 
1990, Dollar 1992, Ghura and Grennes 1993, Darby et al 1999). 
  None of these papers devises a real effective (trade weighted) exchange rate 
(also called REER) and tests the hypothesis of a negative relationship between 
REER and growth.
4 The value added of using a REER is that this measure 
crucially incorporates volatility induced by trading partners and its difference with 
bilateral exchange rate volatility may be substantial leading to erroneous 
interpretations of the exchange rate volatilities associated with different exchange 
rate regimes. 
                                                 
3 A likely explanation is that economies of these countries are more exposed to export portfolio 
risk and dispose of less financial instruments to hedge it. 
4 The only example in this direction is provided by Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) examining the 
effect of the level and volatility of the terms of trade and the real effective exchange rate on 
investment and growth in a panel of 14 sub-Saharan African countries over the 1980–1995 period. 
The authors find that growth is negatively affected by terms of trade instability, while investment 
by real exchange rate instability. Both growth and investment increase when the terms of trade 
improve and real exchange rate overvaluation is eliminated.  
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  Kent and Naya (2002) illustrate this point showing that, in a set of countries 
with low and stable inflation and stable growth rates from 1978 to 1994, the 
REER is only twice as volatile under floating regimes as under fixed regimes. But 
this result is likely to be influenced by a few countries which experienced periods 
of hyperinflation and high volatility. Although this difference is statistically 
significant, results within such countries show that for most countries there was 
no significant increase in effective REER volatility when moving to more flexible 
exchange-rate regimes. Surprisingly, there are even some countries for which 
volatility is lower under more flexible exchange-rate regimes. 
  These are the reasons for using REER volatility to evaluate first the effect of 
the convergence toward a MU on exchange rate instability and, after that, the 
impact of exchange rate instability on growth. 
 
 
3  The definition of the Real effective exchange 
rate risk 
Our REER-based approach at evaluating exchange rate risk hinges on the idea that 
a country may be conceived as having a portfolio of assets represented by its 
relationships with trade partners. 
  More formally, if the i–th country has trade relationships with j (j = 1,..,N) 
partners, the variance of its portfolio 
2

















j σ  is the variance of the return of the j–th asset, ie the rate of return of the 
bilateral exchange rate with the j–th partner, xj is the share of export to the j–th 
partner out of the i–th country total export, σhk is the covariance between bilateral 
exchange rate returns of the i–th country with partners h and k. 
  Our measure of effective exchange rate variance is therefore a ‘portfolio 
variance’. It includes the volatility of each bilateral exchange rate and their 
covariances weighted for their relative trade shares. 
  The REER variable has two main advantages with respect to a simple bilateral 
exchange rate with a leading currency (ie the dollar). First, it includes neighbours’ 
(or trade partners’) externalities in the evaluation of the effects of exchange rate 
volatility on growth. This inclusion is fundamental because a country may have 
good governance and good macroeconomic policies (and, therefore, may be likely 
to have a low bilateral exchange rate volatility with a leading currency, say, the 
dollar) but may import instability via variability of governance and economic  
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policies of its trade partners. Individual country stability is therefore insufficient if 
it is not framed into regional stability and this is why the export portfolio risk 
variable is more likely to measure the costs of missing regional integration.
5 
  Second it takes into account that favorable and unfavorable exchange rate 
movements with different trade partners may compensate each other, thereby 
dampening the negative effects of individual bilateral exchange rate volatility on 
growth (Quian and Varangis 1994). This effect is incorporated in our export 
portfolio risk measure which conveniently takes into account the potential impact 
of trade diversification on export risk. 
  When building the REER index we consider that, as far as export shares of a 
given trading partner get lower, their contribution to the REER becomes 
negligible. 
  For this reason, and in order to avoid to include in the analysis trade partners 
with very small shares, we consider the following three constraints: i) no more 
than 7 partners, ii) a cumulative export share not higher than 60 percent, iii) an 
individual partner share not smaller than 2 percent. When one of these constraints 




4  Descriptive statistics on the REER dynamics for 
Eurozone and non Eurozone countries 
In Table 1 (and in Figures 1 and 2) we show the dynamics of REER volatilities 
per macroareas between 1980 and 2001.
7 
  The inspection of the dynamics of the export portfolio risk variable in the 
EUROZONE countries (column 2, Table 1) shows a sharp rise in volatility 
between 1983 and 1985, a period of high regional exchange rate instability 
because of the frequent realignments among currencies in the European Monetary 
                                                 
5 A typical example for illustrating this point is that the inspection of the volatility of the bilateral 
dollar-Argentinean peso exchange rate would suggest low nominal (and slightly higher real) 
effective exchange rate volatility before the Argentinean crisis, while our measure of real effective 
exchange rate volatility would have been higher in the same period including the volatility 
generated by the devaluation of the currency of one of its main trade partners (such as Brazil). 
6 Since we are interested in the effects of the historically realised REER on growth and not in the 
investigation of its law of variation we prefer the above mentioned way of calculating it to ARCH 
or GARCH measures of volatility. 
7 The considered macroareas are: i) EUROZONE countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Greece, ii) EU non 
EUROZONE countries: Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, iii) OECD non EU and non 
developping countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
United States.  
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System and another smaller peak between 1991 and 1993. After 1993 we assist to 
a sharp decline in volatility for Eurozone countries. At the end of 2001 the export 
portfolio variance in the EUROZONE countries is more than four times smaller 
than at the end of the 1993. This descriptive finding does not contradict the 
hypothesis of the sensible effects of the European Monetary Union on the 
reduction of real effective exchange rate volatility of its members in the previous 
years and after the third and last step of the EMU. 
  In the three EU non EUROZONE countries volatility is always smaller than 
EUROZONE volatility (except for the 2001), it does not show the peak of the 
EUROZONE members at the end of 1985, while the peak between 1991 and 
1993, even though significant, is smaller (column 3, Table 1). 
  The path for OECD non EU countries is quite different and their volatility is 
always bigger than that of EUROZONE countries (column 4, Table 1).
8 The peak 
between 1981 and 1985 is less significant with respect to the other areas 
(Figure 1). In the analysis within the area it is three times smaller with respect to 
the peak between 1993 and 1995.
9 
  Some interesting considerations may be drawn from these descriptive 
statistics. The advantage of the medicine (a common currency) in terms of 
reduction of exchange rate volatility is primarily for those countries having ex 
ante a ‘more severe pathology’ (higher level of such variable). This determines for 
them a higher incentive to follow the therapy. It is not surprise therefore that those 
joining the common currency have a REER which is up to three times higher than 
EU countries which did not join. A second consideration is that MU may have 
generated positive externalities for non participating EU countries which 




                                                 
8 In this group we exclude from OECD countries newcomers, Mexico and Korea given that with 
our classification we want to identify non EU non developing countries. 
9 The extremely high REER volatility during this period partially depends on Canada. Given that 
75% of canadian exports are toward the US and the absence of trade diversification increases the 
export and exchange rate risk.  
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5  Descriptive statistics on the quality and 
heterogeneity of economic policies and 
institutional indicators for Eurozone and non 
Eurozone countries 
The other potential source of benefits from MU is the expected change and 
harmonization in the institutional and policy environment. Durlauf and Quah 
(1998) identify 87 different proxies of variables enhancing growth in a survey of 
the related literature. Among them the quality of institutions (Rodrik 2000, Barro-
Sala-i-Martin 1995, 1996, 2002), financial institutions (Pagano 1993, King and 
Levine 1997) appear together with human capital (Mankiw and Romer and Weil 
1992), the government sector (Hall and Jones 1997), social and political stability 
(Alesina and Perotti 1994), corruption (Mauro 1995), social capital (Knack and 
Keefer 1997),
10 income inequality (Persson and Tabellini 1994, Perotti 1996) and 
many others. In evaluating the relative weight of each of these variables, Sala-y-
Martin (2002) finds that institutional quality is one of the most robust. 
  Other contributions specify why we expect institutions to play an important 
role. Rodrik (1999, 2002) and Frankel (2002) argue that market based economies, 
to be successful, crucially need good institutions and, more specifically, 
institutions to protect property rights, to fight corruption, to support 
macroeconomic stabilization and to promote social cohesion. Klein and Luu 
(2003) find that that technical efficiency is positively related to policies 
supporting laissez-faire and political structures that promoting policy stability. 
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) find that good institutions support the creation of 
infrastructure needed to promote growth. 
  In this perspective we observe that the convergence toward a currency union 
unequivocally generates changes in governance of the member states. One of  its 
effects is the partial devolution of economic and political power from national to 
European institutions. 
  To evaluate the direction of changes in average quality and homogeneity of 
governance we analyse the dynamics of the economic freedom indicators of the 
Frazer Institute for different groups of countries. The indicators being part of the 
different governance factors and the calculation approaches are described in the 
legend of Table 2. Given the way these indicators are formed we consider the 
aggregate index as a proxy of the quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic 
policies (QIRMP), when we do not refer more specifically to some of them 
composing the aggregate index. 
                                                 
10 According to these authors financial institutions improve the screening and monitoring of 
investment projects, provide mobilisation and aggregation services to savings and enhance 
opportunities for risk management and liquidity.  
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  The main general result in this table is that EU eurozone countries exhibit: 
i) a higher  relative  improvement  with  respect to EU non eurozone and other 
OECD non eurozone in the ‘access to sound money indicators’, ii) quite 
surprisingly a lower relative improvement in the general QIRMP indicator and in 
the specific indicators of credit and labour market regulation; iii) a sharply lower 
within group variability in all the considered indicators. 
 
 
6 The  econometric  specification 
To test the impact of exchange rate risk and governance quality on levels and 
growth per capita GDP consider the standard MRW (1992) production function 
taking into account the role of human capital 
 
1 with ) L A ( H K ) AL , H , k ( F Y
1
t t t t t < β + α = =
β − α − β α  (6.1) 
 
where H is the stock of human capital, while L and K are the two traditional 
labour and physical capital inputs and A is a labour augmenting factor. 
  Physical and human capital follow the standard laws of motion. 
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where sk and sh are the fractions of income respectively invested in physical and 
human capital. The exogenous growth of the labour input is expressed as 
 
nt
0 t e L L =  (6.4)
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Differently from MRW (1992), we test whether the variable resuming the effect 
of the residual factors affecting productivity includes REER volatility and 
institutional factors affected by the convergence toward the monetary union. 
                                                 
11 The exogeneity of labour force growth is a restrictive assumption which can be accepted 
considering that changes in per capita income on fertility affect labour force with lags which go 
beyond the time interval considered in our estimate (especially panel estimates). Moreover, we 
may also assume that with migration and partial international mobility of labour the effect of 
domestic fertility on the labour force is limited.  
16 
  We therefore model labour augmenting technological progress as formed by 
two components 
 




AV(QIRMP, REER, ...)(t) = AV(0)e
gV(t) and AKP(t) = AKP(0)e
gKP(t) 
 
AKP(t) is the contribution to technological progress of the stock of weightless 
infinitely reproducible knowledge products and gKP its rate of growth, whereas AV 
is a measure of all factors different from the former affecting the capacity of 
labour productivity of affecting per capita GDP (and, among them, the quality of 
governance and of macroeconomic policies (QIRMP) and REER volatility) and 
gV its rate of growth.
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  By rewriting the production function in terms of output per efficiency units as 
y = k
αh
β we can obtain the two standard growth equations 
 
t t k t k ) g n ( y s k δ + + − = &  (6.6) 
 




g = gEPR + gQI + gKP 
 
If we set the growth of physical and human capital equal to zero in the steady state 
we get 
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* h  (6.9) 
 
                                                 
12 For simplicity these two factors are modelled here as augmenting the productivity of labour, 
even though only some of their features may be strictly considered as such (ie quality of 
institutions regarding restriction of labur and credit markets, exchange rate induced effects on 
competitiveness of domestic labour force, etc.)  
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Substituting h* and k* into the production function and taking logs we obtain 
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where c  =  ln(AKP(0)) + gKPt is the quasi-public good component of knowledge 
products and is therefore assumed constant across countries and 
[ln(AQIMP) + gPIMPt], 2[ln(AREERV) + gREERVt] are two specific components (quality 
of institutional rules and macroeconomic policies and real effective exchange rate 
volatility) of the country specific factors augmenting the effects of labour input on 
levels and growth of real per capita GDP when we interpret AV(QI, REERV, ...) as 
AV = γ1AQIMP*γ2AREERV*γ3Ar where Ar captures all additional factors affecting 
the labour augmenting component. In this augmented MRW model, the possibility 
that all countries have the same steady state level of per capita income depends 
not only on the levelling of their rate of population growth and of their physical 
and human capital investment rates, but also on REER and quality of rules and 
macroeconomic policies. 
  Given the production function specified in 1 it is possible to show that, in the 
proximity of the balanced growth path, y converges to y* at the rate 
(1 - α - β)(n + g) ≡ λ since the solution of the differential equation
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If we add ln(y*) - ln(y0) to both sides we get an equation explaining the rate of 
growth 
 
                                                 
13 This obviously implies that the speed of convergence differs across countries and is crucially 
influenced by the pace of labour augmenting A-factors.  
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Replacing ln(y*) with our solution we get 
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To interpret our model, and, especially, findings from the growth estimate in 
(6.16) remember that, while the MRW estimation framework was adopted by the 
authors originally to test the (human capital augmented) Solow exogenous growth 
model, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) show that such estimation framework is 
consistent with any growth model that admits a balanced growth path and 
therefore is compatible also with suitable endogenous growth models. 
  More specifically, Bernanke and Gurkaynak propose an example of such 
observationally equivalent model in which total factor productivity is determined 
by education. 
  The exogenous/endogenous growth issue has special interest when we 
interpret the results of our growth equation, given that the interpretation under the 
two perspectives is quite different. 
  The validity of the MRW framework in the augmented Solow model 
perspective, implies that growth is determined by transitional dynamics, leading to 
the steady state equilibrium level of per capita GDP (the latter being affected by 
country fundamentals which include human capital investment). Growth from this 
perspective is uniquely determined by exogenous changes in the labour 
augmenting A-factor. 
  The same empirical finding would imply, in the endogenous growth 
perspective, that human capital investment directly affects growth and not just 
equilibrium levels of per capita GDP. 
  However, since we introduce REER volatility and quality of institutions and 
economic policies as determinants of the A-factor, the traditional distinction 
between exogenous/endogenous growth models in terms of the role of economic 
policy as a growth stimulus fades away.  
19 
  By arguing that REER volatility and quality of institutions and economic 
policies proxy important components of the A-factor which augments labour 
productivity and is uniquely responsible of further growth from the equilibrium 
point, we implicitly introduce the importance of institutions and policies also in 




7  The choice of regressors 
Variables for our empirical analysis are taken from the World Bank (WB) 
database. The dependent variable Y/L is the real gross domestic product per 
working-age person, L is the working age population (population aged between 
15–64). sk is gross domestic investment over GDP and is calculated using values 
taken from Penn World Tables or, alternatively, World Bank data.
15 
  In our empirical estimate we use basically three different types of human 
capital proxies. 
  The first is represented by measures of school enrollment ratios at different 
educational levels. School enrollment data are reported to the UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics by national authorities.
16 
  The use of gross enrolment ratios as proxies of human capital investment, 
even tough used in most empirical growth papers, has been subject to severe 
criticism (Wossmann, 2003). Current enrollment ratios represent the investment 
of future and not current workers and, even if we lag this variable, it is very 
difficult to relate it exactly with the human capital investment of current workers. 
This is why average schooling years are considered a superior proxy when 
measuring the investment in human capital of the current labour force. 
                                                 
14 Dowrick and Rogers (2002) implicitly share our view by arguing that ‘the Solow-Swann steady 
state is a moving target which grows at different rates in each country’ and by adding that such 
growth depends on technical progress which ‘may well reflect unobserved policy and institutional 
differences’. 
15 Penn World Tables are the result of a United Nation International Comparison Project whose 
aim is to create information for consistent cross-country comparisons in time and space starting 
from price surveys of identical sets of good and services in different countries. To find a detailed 
discussion of the methodology and of the critical issues of PWTs see Heston-Summers (1988, 
1991 and 1996). 
16 Usually we find measurs of gross and net school enrollment ratios. The first is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the 
level of education shown, the second is the ratio of children of primary school age who are 
enrolled in school. Although the net enrollment ratio is more precise because excludes overage 
students in an attempt to capture more accurately the system’s coverage, we use the gross 
enrollment ratio because of the scarcity of data available for the net ratio.  
20 
  As a proxy of average schooling years we use ten-year data calculated by 
Barro and Lee (2000). Barro and Lee apply basically the same methodology based 
on census and survey data on educational attainment levels, but they extend the 
coverage of countries and years. 
  There is a mayor criticisms that render years of schooling a poor proxy for the 
human capital stock. Specifying human capital by average year of schooling 
implicitly gives the same weight to any year of schooling acquired by a person 
regardless of the efficiency of the educational system, of the quality of teaching, 
of the educational infrastructure, or of the curriculum. The indicator should 
therefore be weighted according to the quality of the education system in which it 
has taken place. 
  To encompass this problem we use as a third proxy of human capital, the 
Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) educational quality index, conveniently 




8 Empirical  findings 
We test the significance of institutional quality and REER volatility on real per 
capita GDP in levels and on per capita GDP growth in cross sectional and panel 
estimates. 
  Results on the determinants of real GDP levels in 4(interval)*5-year panel 
data
17 are quite robust and consistent with the theory (Tables 3.1–3.2).
18 
  Coefficients pass several tests on restrictions imposed by the model, such as 
those on i) diminishing returns on physical and human capital, ii) nonzero 
physical and human capital shares and iii) equality between the sum of the 
physical and human capital coefficients and the coefficient on the variable 
summing rates of change in population and in technological process plus 
depreciation. The hypothesis of the joint insignificance of fixed effects is always 
rejected and the model performs better when explaining variability between 
countries than within the same country in moments of time. 
  In most estimates confidence intervals suggest that the human capital share, 
even though lower in mean than what expected, is not significantly different from 
                                                 
17 The relative advantage of panel over cross-sectional estimates is that the former avoid the cross-
sectional constant critique, or the assumption that the part of the labour augmenting component 
unexplained by our regressors is the same for each country (Islam 1995, Temple 1999). 
18 Sensitivity analysis on our results shows that they are robust to the use of the three different 
proxies of human capital, to the use of WB or PWT investment in physical capital and also to the 
adoption of beginning of period or of average period regressors. Results are omitted for reasons of 
space and are available upon request.  
21 
the lower bound indicated by MRW in their paper (1/3).
19 The physical capital 
share is lower than expected, consistently with results obtained by the same 
authors as well. Coefficients of A-factors added to the estimates (QIRMP and 
REER) have the expected sign and are lower than one confirming our hypothesis 
that the two factors contribute to explain only part of the overall labour 
augmenting component. A major problem though is that REER volatility and 
quality of institutions are highly correlated variables (around .5). Therefore their 
coefficients tend to be unstable when they are both present in the estimate. This is 
why we propose estimates with, alternatively, one of them present. 
  In level panel estimates we have an interesting alternative to evaluate the 
anticipated effects of EMU on our estimates. The last two spells of our 
4(interval)*5-year panel coincide with the period in which we identified that 
anticipated effects of convergence toward monetary union materialised in terms of 
reduced REER and improved institutional quality. We may therefore directly 
estimate the impact of convergence toward the EMU by introducing a dummy for 
Eurozone countries covering the last two five year periods. Our results (Tables 
3.1–3.2) show that the UME dummy effect is quite significant in level estimates 
both when we introduce it in a simple MRW estimate and when we add to 
physical and human capital one of the two above considered variables affected by 
EMU convergence (REER and institutional quality). Since we estimate a fixed 
effect model, the impact of the UME dummy cannot be confused with country 
specific constant characteristics which positively affect levels of per capita GDP. 
The effect of the dummy therefore captures a positive impact on the dependent 
variable for the MU countries in the period of the Stability and Growth Pact (even 
though not necessarily due to the Pact), independent from other unobserved MU 
country specific factors which are invariant in time. 
  Level cross-sectional estimates (Table 4) give results which are not 
substantially different from those of panel estimates, even though the sharp 
reduction of degrees of freedom seems to limit the set of regressions which satisfy 
all our hypotheses on coefficient magnitudes and parameters restrictions. 
  For growth estimates we report both cross-sectional and panel results (Tables 
5–6.2). As expected, it is difficult that all hypotheses of conditional convergence 
be respected in short time intervals such as those considered in our panel 
estimates. The model proves to weaker in the repeated five year interval of panel 
estimates than in the larger twenty year sample period of cross-sectional 
estimates, especially when we look at human capital investment which is not 
significant in panel growth estimates, consistently with Islam (1995) results. Both 
cross sectional and panel convergence estimates support our hypothesis on the 
relevance of REER and institutional quality indicators. 
                                                 
19 Tests of this hypothesis are omitted for reasons of space and are available upon request.  
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  Results, presented in tables 3.1–6.2 are confirmed (with some exceptions) 
when we use bootstrap standard errors and are therefore robust to changes in 
sample composition and independent from the assumption of a specific functional 
form for the dependent variable.
20 
  Summing up, we find that the REER variance effect is statistically significant 
both in panel and cross-sectional level and growth estimates. When looking at the 
economic significance of the REER variance effect in the five year horizon of the 
panel interval we find that a doubling of the REER variance generates a change of 
1–2 percent (0.5 percent) in levels (rates of growth) of real per capita GDP. In 
cross-sectional estimates which cover a longer time horizon the same change in 
the REER variance generates an effect on levels up to 9 percent and on rates of 
growth is around 4.5 percent. 
  Presentation of results consistent with the model (tables 3.1–6.2) with more 
estimates for panel levels and less for panel convergence) also outline the 
‘robustness borders’ of our results (superior robustness of panel estimates in 
levels) and try as far as possible to tackle the two well known problems of 
heterogeneity
21 and endogeneity (in using long lags for the regressors), aware of 
the trade-off between MRW model requirements (which imply using sample 
period averages of regressors) and econometric problems (which require lagged or 




In the trilemma generated by global integration Monetary Unions are considered 
as an optimal way to pursue at least two of the three desirable goals at stake 
(economic integration and proper public policy management) at the expense of the 
third (national sovereignty) or as a subregional partial solution to the trilemma 
when lack of more broader consensus for the loss of sovereignty exists. 
                                                 
20 Bootstrapping provides an alternative way of estimating standard errors which does not rely on 
any a priori given distributional form (Efron 1979, Efron and Stein 1981, Efron and Tibshirani 
1986). More specifically, in each trial of the bootstrapping procedure we draw with replacement N 
observations from the N observation dataset (therefore in each trials some countries  may have 
higher weight and other countries may not be included in the sample). We perform two thousands 
of trials and for each of them we calculated the coefficient magnitude. The estimate of the standard 
error os that statistics then depends on the variability of the estimate in the different trials. In this 
sense, and given that in each trial of the bootstrapping procedure we draw with replacement N 
observations from the N observation dataset, bootstrapping measures the sensitivity of the result to 
changes in the number of observations. 
21 The sensitivity of our results to different weights on countries/observations is implicitly tested 
the drawing with replacement approach of bootstrap estimates.  
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  We measure in this paper whether such solution has testable consequences on 
levels and growth of real per capita GDP consistently with the title of the 
agreement establishing the path for convergence toward the EMU (the Stability 
and Growth Pact). 
  We start with a short institutional background documenting the strict 
consequentiality between the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, 
on the one side, and the target of the MU, on the other side, showing how EU-non 
Eurozone countries had weaker obligations in the convergence period. We 
therefore argue that effects of MU are anticipated and must be evaluated starting 
from the convergence process. 
  In principle, and on the basis of theoretical and simply rational grounds, we 
expect that the anticipated and concurring effects of the EMU should materialize 
in terms of reduced REER volatility and of higher quality and reduced within 
group variability of institutional rules and economic policies. When comparing 
relative changes in these variables of EU Eurozone countries with a control 
sample we find with surprise that, while the REER volatility reduction effect is 
strong and confirmed, the positive change in quality of institutional rules and 
economic policies is not higher than that in EU non Eurozone and in other non 
OECD countries. 
  In a second step we test in different ways whether these two effects have 
significant impact on levels and growth of per capita GDP. We find a robust effect 
on levels for both institutional quality and reduction of REER volatility, 
confirmed and reinforced by a direct positive effect of Eurozone countries during 
the convergence period. We also find a weaker and less robust positive effect on 
growth of the two variables in cross-sectional and panel estimates. 
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Table 1.   The relative dynamics of export portfolio volatility 
     across  macroareas 
 
  World  Eurozone  Eu No Eurozone  OECD No EU 
1981/12 1.000  0.0306  0.0054  0.1776 
1983/12 3.451  0.0169  0.0098  0.2161 
1986/12 >100  0.0316  0.0039  0.2841 
1987/12 22.917  0.0104  0.0041  0.1109 
1989/12 >100  0.0187  0.0028  0.1728 
1991/12 1.572  0.0235  0.0021  0.2589 
1993/12 4.230  0.0261  0.0127  0.2536 
1995/12 1.197  0.0071  0.0026  0.9582 
1997/12 0.232  0.0046  0.0031  0.1114 
1999/12 0.363  0.0068  0.0027  0.1660 
2001/12 0.432  0.0065  0.0096  0.0525 
(monthly REER variance is calculated as two-year moving average of REER monthly 
returns. World December 1981=1) 
 
 
The Export portfolio risk or real effective exchange rate (REER) variance for the 
i–th country having  trade relationships with j (j = 1,..,N) partners, 
2


















j σ  is the variance of the return of the j–th asset, ie the rate of return of the 
bilateral exchange rate with the j–th partner. xj is the share of export to the j–th 
partner out of the i–th country total export, σhk is the covariance between bilateral 
exchange rate returns of the i–th country with partners h and k. 
  When building the REER index we consider that, as far as export shares of a 
given trading partner get lower, their  contribution to the REER becomes 
negligible. 
  For this reason, and in order to avoid to include in the analysis trade partners 
with very small shares, we consider the following three constraints: i) no more 
than 7 partners; ii) a cumulative export share not higher than 60 percent; iii) an 
individual partner share not smaller than 2 percent. When one of these constraints 
is hit we do not include additional trade partners in our EPR measure. 
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Figure 1.  Dynamics of export portfolio volatility in EU 
      and OECD no EU countries 
      (monthly REER variance is calculated as two-year moving 
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Figure 2.  Dynamics of export portfolio volatility in 
     EUROZONE  countries and EU NO EUROZONE 















































































































































































































































Table 2.   Changes in real effective exchange rates (REER) 
















































s.d. / 1993 
s.d.) 
Eurozone  0.660 1.071 1.102 1.179 0.718 1.119 0.075 
UE non 
Eurozone  0.895 1.079 1.124 1.145 1.085 1.309 0.311 
OECD 
non  EU 1.478 1.049 1.116 1.088 0.867 1.476 0.259 
Non 
OECD  1.744 1.260 1.156 2.743 0.801 0.753 0.795 
 
Legend: REER: real effective exchange rate (see Table 2 legend) QIRMP: index of the quality of institutions 
and of economic policies. It is measured as a simple average of the following composed indicators. 1 Size of 
Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises. A) General government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption; B)  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP; C)  Government 
enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP; D) Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which 
it applies); i) Top marginal tax rate (excluding applicable payroll taxes); ii) Top marginal tax rate (including 
applicable payroll taxes). 2 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights. A) Judicial independence. the 
judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes; B) Impartial 
court. A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions 
or regulation; C) Protection of intellectual property; D) Military interference in rule of law and the political 
process; E) Integrity of the legal system. 3 Access to Sound Money. A) Average annual growth of the money 
supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years; B) Standard 
inflation variability in the last five years; C) Recent inflation rate; D) Freedom to own foreign currency bank 
accounts domestically and abroad. 4 Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners. A) Taxes on international 
trade; i) Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports; ii) Mean tariff 
rate; iii) Standard deviation of tariff rates; B) Regulatory trade barriers; i) Hidden import barriers. No barriers 
other than published tariffs and quotas; ii) Costs of importing. The combined effect of import tariffs, licence 
fees, bank fees, and the time required for administrative red-tape raises the costs of importing equipment; 
C) Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size; D) Difference between official exchange rate and 
black market rate, E) International capital market controls; i) Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and 
foreign access to domestic capital markets; ii) Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital 
market exchange with foreigners index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories. 5 Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, and Business. A) Credit Market Regulations; i) Ownership of banks. percentage of deposits held in 
privately owned banks; ii) Competition. Domestic banks face competition from foreign banks; iii) Extension 
of credit. percentage of credit extended to private sector; iv)  Avoidance of interest rate controls and 
regulations that lead to negative real interest rates; v) Interest rate controls. Interest rate controls on bank 
deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the market; B)  Labor Market Regulations; i)  Impact of 
minimum wage. The minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages because it is too low or not 
obeyed; ii) Hiring and firing practices. Hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private 
contract; iii)  Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining; 
iv) Unemployment Benefits. The unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work; v) Use of 
conscripts to obtain military personnel; C) Business Regulations; i) Price controls. Extent to which businesses 
are free to set their own prices; ii) Administrative conditions and new businesses. Administrative procedures 
are an important obstacle to starting a new business; iii)  Time with government bureaucracy. Senior 
management spends a substantial amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy; iv) Starting a new 
business. Starting a new business is generally easy; v) Irregular payments. Irregular, additional payments 
connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police 




Table 3.1  The determinants of levels of real per capita GDP 
      (panel estimates): the effect of REER volatility and 
      of quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic 
      policies (five year spells between 1980–2001) 
 
  MRW    Estimates augmented with REER variance 
and QIRMP variables 
Lngcapform (1)  0.167 **  0.198 ** 0.112 ** 0.144 **  0.240 ** 
  [0.176]   [4.480]  [2.370]  [3.000]   [4.900]   
Lnaverschol (2)  0.340 **  0.311 ** 0.339 ** 0.290 **  0.442 ** 
  [8.480]   [7.880]  [5.580]  [4.660]   [6.610]   
Lnngd (3)  –0.333 **  –0.330 ** –0.467 ** –0.582 **  –0.610 ** 
  [–3.110]   [–3.160]  [–3.970]  [–5.700]   [–5.920]   
LnREERV       –0.017 **      
       [–3.430]        
LnQIRMP        0.410  **     
        [6.550]       
Lncredlabbus            0.542  ** 
            [6.400]   
Ume     0.288 ** 0.202 ** 0.180 **  0.179 ** 
     [5.120]  [4.570]  [4.110]   [3.970]   
Constant  7.618   7.708 ** 7.122 ** 6.494 **  6.054 ** 





















2  overall  0.5694   0.5755  0.6694  0.6642   0.6712   
R
2  between  0.5542   0.5765   0.711  0.6781   0.6816   
R
2  within  0.1558   0.2006  0.2508  0.3579   0.3924   
α  0.111   0.131  0.077  0.101   0.143   
β  0.226   0.206  0.234  0.202   0.263   
H0:  (1)+(2)  =  –(3)  1.84   2.62  0.01  1.28   0.28   
  (0.4662)   (0.1062)  (0.9046)  (0.2592)   (0.5990)   
H0: β=0  69.11   86.21  51.24  34.26   75.76   
  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)   
Countries  101    101  81  91   89   
Obs  608   608  383  443   417   
 
Legend: lngcapform: log of gross capital formation over GDP (WB data); lnaverschol 
average schooling of the working population; lnngd: log of the sum of the rate of growth 
of population, stock of capital depreciation and technological progress; LnQIRMP: 
Quality of institutional rules and of macroeconomic policies (see table 3 legend), 
lncredlabus log of the index on Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (see table 3 
legend); LnREERV: real effective exchange rate variance  (see Table 2 legend); UME: 
dummy for Eurozone countries in the 1992–2001 period. 
  All regressors are calculated as four year averages excluding the final year of the five 
year time spell. T-stats are in square brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap 
standard errors, * 90 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors (percentile and 
bias corrected approach with 2000 replications). 
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Table 3.2  The determinants of levels of real per capita GDP 
      (panel estimates): the effect of REER volatility and 
      of quality of institutional rules and macroeconomic 
      policies (five year spells between 1980–2001) 
 
  MRW    Estimates augmented with REER variance 
and QIRMP variables 
Lngcapfis (1)  0.185 **  0.190 ** 0.161 ** 0.111 **  0.139 ** 
  [5.870]   [6.200]  [4.310]  [3.190]   [3.850]   
Lnaverschoolqua (2) 0.292 **  0.267 ** 0.280 ** 0.215 **  0.316 ** 
  [7.500]   [6.980]  [5.210]  [4.580]   [6.180]   
Lnngd (3)  –0.545 **  –0.516 ** –0.382 ** –0.480 **  –0.466 ** 
  [–4.840]   [–4.710]  [–3.300]  [–4.670]   [–4.320]   
LnREERV       –0.011 **      
       [–2.280]        
ume     0.229 ** 0.200 ** 0.180 **  0.184 ** 
     [4.930]  [4.730]  [4.400]   [4.400]   
Lncredlabbus            0.395  ** 
            [4.620]   
LnQIRMP        0.385  **     
        [6.350]       
Constant  7.339 **  7.453 ** 7.713 ** 6.980 **  6.857 ** 




















2  overall  0.691   0.700  0.724  0.733   0.755   
R
2  between  0.693   0.711  0.746  0.747   0.760   
R
2  within  0.216   0.263  0.272  0.366   0.362   
α  0.125   0.130  0.112  0.084   0.096   
β  0.198   0.183  0.194  0.162   0.217   
H0:  (1)+(2)  =  –(3)  0.30   0.25  0.19  1.56   0.01   
  (0.5822)   (0.6194)  (0.6646)  (0.2130)   (0.9308)   
H0: β=0  86.22   72.23  42.60  30.59   62.48   
  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)   
Countries  87   87  75  83   81   
Obs  476   476  356  414   389   
 
Legend: lngcapfis: log of gross capital formation over GDP (PWT data); 
lnaverschoolqua: log of average schooling of the working population corrected for quality 
following Hanushek and Kimko (2000); lnngd: log of the sum of the rate of growth of 
population, stock of capital depreciation and technological progress; LnQIRMP: Quality 
of institutional rules and of macroeconomic policies (see table 3 legend), lncredlabus log 
of the index on Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (see table 3 legend); 
LnREERV: real effective exchange rate variance  (see Table 2 legend). 
  All regressors are calculated in the first of the five year time spell. T-stats are in 
square brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors, * 90 percent 





Table 4.   The determinants of levels of real per capita GDP 
      (cross-sectional estimates): the effect of REER 
      volatility and of quality of institutional rules and 
     macroeconomic  policies 
 
  MRW   Estimates augmented with REER variance and 
QIRMP variables 
Lncapfis  (1)  0.593  ** 0.350 ** 0.519 ** 0.535 ** 0.660 ** 0.747  ** 
  [2.580]   [1.640]  [2.030]  [1.990]  [2.550]  [3.030]   
Lnschooltertgro  (2) 0.746  ** 0.794 ** 0.814 ** 0.759 ** 0.661 ** 0.741  ** 
  [7.660]   [8.520]  [9.210]  [8.780]  [6.680]  [8.130]   
Lnngd  (3)  –1.637  ** –1.376 ** –1.890 ** –2.010 ** –2.003 ** –2.224  ** 
  [–2.050]   [–1.980]  [–2.870]  [–3.510]  [–3.600]  [–3.600]   
LnREERV     –0.145 ** –0.096 ** –0.062 *       
     [–3.390]  [–2.650]  [–2.330]        
LnQIRMP         1.644 ** 2.095 **     
         [3.040]  [4.350]      
Lncredlabbus       1.704 **    2.472  ** 
       [3.380]     [4.860]   
Constant  7.542  **  6.830 ** 3.370 * 3.339 * 3.117 * 2.171  * 
  [3.640]   [3.870]  [1.570]  [1.810]  [1.710]  [1.060]   
R
2  0.699   0.767  0.803  0.826  0.789  0.769   
α  0.253   0.163  0.223  0.233  0.284  0.300   
β  0.319   0.370  0.349  0.331  0.285  0.298   
H0:  (1)+(2)  =  –(3)  0.15   0.11  0.60  1.24  1.15  1.14   
  (0.7017)   (0.7380)  (0.4423)  (0.2699)  (0.2876)   (28.80)   
H0: β=0  34.01   41.35  40.71  39.17  30.14  38.30   
  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
obs  94   84  74  75  82  82   
 
Legend: lngcapfis: log of gross capital formation over GDP (PWT data); lnschooltergro: log of 
tertiary school gross enrolment ratio; lnngd: log of the sum of the rate of growth of population, 
stock of capital depreciation and technological progress; LnQIRMP: Quality of institutional rules 
and of macroeconomic policies (see table 3 legend), lncredlabus log of the index on Regulation of 
Credit, Labor, and Business (see table 3 legend); LnREERV: real effective exchange rate variance 
(see Table 2 legend). 
  All regressors are calculated in the first year of the sample period. T-stats are in square 
brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors, * 90 percent significance with 




Table 5.   The determinants of rates of growth of real per 
      capita GDP (panel estimates): the effect of REER 
      volatility and of quality of institutional rules and 
     macroeconomic  policies 
 
 MRW   Estimates augmented with REER 
variance and QIRMP variables 
Lngdpwr0 –0.152 ** –0.181 *  –0.157  * 
 [–7.840]   [–5.500]   [–5.110]   
Lngcapform (1)  0.108 ** 0.058 **  0.061 ** 
 [5.180]   [2.060]   [2.250]   
Lnaverschool (2)  –0.026 ** 0.059 *  0.027 * 
 [–1.260]   [1.550]   [0.720]   
Lnngd (3)  –0.252 ** –0.162 **  –0.160 * 
 [–5.110]   [–2.300]   [–2.650]   
LnREERV   –0.006 **     
   [–1.990]      
LnQIRMP     0.066  * 
     [1.740]   
Constant 0.919 ** 1.162 *  0.964  * 
 [4.490]   [3.850]   [3.860]   
H0: Joint insignificance of fixed effects 3.80   2.18   2.39  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
R
2 overall  0.0014   0.0007   0.0055  
R
2 between  0.0048   0.0113   0.0245  
R
2 within  0.2054   0.1113   0.0840  
α  0.099  0.052   0.056   
β  –0.024  0.053   0.024   
H0: (1)+(2) = –(3)  10.35   0.31   0.90  
 (0.0014)   (0.5795)   (0.3427)   
H0: β=0  1.53  2.69   0.54   
 (0.2171)   (0.1023)   (0.4620)   
Countries 99   81   91   
Obs 593   378   440   
 
Legend: lngdpwr0: log of real per capita GDP in the first year of the sample period; 
lngcapform: log of gross capital formation over GDP (WB data) (moving average of the 
sample period excluding the final year); lnaverschol average schooling of the working 
population (moving average of the sample period excluding the final year); lnngd: log of 
the sum of the rate of growth of population, stock of capital depreciation and 
technological progress; LnREERV: log of one year variance of REER monthly returns 
(for the calculation of the REER see table 2 legend) (moving average of the sample 
period excluding the final year); LnQIRMP: Quality of institutional rules and of 
macroeconomic policies (see table 3 legend). 
  T-stats are in square brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap standard 
errors, * 90 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors (percentile and bias 




Table 6.1.  The determinants of rates of growth of real per 
      capita GDP (cross-sectional estimates): the effect of 
      REER volatility and of quality of institutional rules 
      and macroeconomic policies 
 
  MRW   Estimates augmented with REER variance 
and QIRMP variances 
Lngdpwr0 –0.131  *  –0.183 ** –0.225 ** –0.249  ** 
  [–2.090]   [–3.300]   [–3.430]  [–4.1200]   
Lncapfis (1)  0.260 **  0.198 ** 0.337 ** 0.297 ** 
  [3.000]   [2.300]   [3.150]  [2.9600]   
Lnschoolsecgro (2) 0.141 *  0.242 ** 0.277 ** 0.387 ** 
  [1.560]   [2.660]  [2.8300]  [4.1300]   
LnREERV (3)     –0.045 **   –0.035 ** 
     [–2.830]    [–1.9300]   
Lnmngd –1.227  **  –0.977 ** –0.899 ** –0.719  ** 
  [–3.890]   [–2.750]  [–3.0700] [–2.1800]   
LnQIRMP       0.690 ** 0.369  ** 
       [2.8900]  [1.8700]   
Lncredlabbus            
            
Constant  –1.309  *  –0.546 * –0.496 * –0.470  * 
  [–1.690]    [–0.610]  [–0.620]  [–0.590]   
R
2  0.281    0.442  0.405  0.540   
α  0.186    0.137  0.209  0.177   
β  0.101    0.168  0.171  0.230   
H0: (1)+(2) = –(3)  7.11   2.07   0.90   0.01  
  (0.0091)    (0.1544)  (0.3456)  (0.9209)   
H0: β=0  2.93   9.44  11.22  28.04   
 (0.0902)    (0.0030)   (0.0013)   (0.00)   
Obs  93    80  82  74   
 
Legend: lngdpwr0: log of real per capita GDP in the first year of the sample period; 
lncapfis: log of gross capital formation over GDP (PWT data); lnschoolsecgro: log of 
secondary school gross enrolment ratio; lnngd: log of the sum of the rate of growth of 
population, stock of capital depreciation and technological progress; LnREERV: log of 
one year variance of REER monthly returns (for the calculation of the REER see table 2 
legend) (moving average of the sample period excluding the final year); LnQIRMP: 
Quality of institutional rules and of macroeconomic policies (see table 3 legend), 
lncredlabus log of the index on Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (see table 3 
legend). 
  T-stats are in square brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap standard 
errors, * 90 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors (percentile and bias 




Table 6.2  The determinants of rates of growth of real per 
      capita GDP (cross-sectional estimates): the effect of 
      REER volatility and of quality of institutional rules 
      and macroeconomic policies 
 
 MRW   Estimates augmented with REER 
variance and QIRMP variables 
Lngdpwr0 –0.152 ** –0.181 *  –0.157  * 
 [–7.840]   [–5.500]   [–5.110]   
Lngcapform (1)  0.108 ** 0.058 **  0.061 ** 
 [5.180]   [2.060]   [2.250]   
Lnaverschool (2)  –0.026 ** 0.059 *  0.027 * 
 [–1.260]   [1.550]   [0.720]   
Lnngd (3)  –0.252 ** –0.162 **  –0.160 * 
 [–5.110]   [–2.300]   [–2.650]   
LnREERV   –0.006 **     
   [–1.990]      
LnQIRMP     0.066  * 
     [1.740]   
Constant 0.919 ** 1.162 *  0.964  * 
 [4.490]   [3.850]   [3.860]   
H0: Joint insignificance of fixed effects 3.80   2.18   2.39  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
R
2 overall  0.0014   0.0007   0.0055  
R
2 between  0.0048   0.0113   0.0245  
R
2 within  0.2054   0.1113   0.0840  
α  0.099  0.052   0.056   
β  –0.024  0.053   0.024   
H0: (1)+(2) = –(3)  10.35   0.31   0.90  
 (0.0014)   (0.5795)   (0.3427)   
H0: β=0  1.53  2.69   0.54   
 (0.2171)   (0.1023)   (0.4620)   
Countries 99   81   91   
Obs 593   378   440   
 
Legend: lngdpwr0: log of real per capita GDP in the first year of the sample period; 
lncapfis: log of gross capital formation over GDP (PWT data); lnaverschoolqua average 
schooling of the working population corrected for quality; lnngd: log of the sum of the 
rate of growth of population, stock of capital depreciation and technological progress; 
LnREERV: log of  one year variance of REER monthly returns (for the calculation of the 
REER see table 2 legend) (moving average of the sample period excluding the final year);  
LnQIRMP: Quality of institutional rules and of macroeconomic policies (see table 3 
legend), lncredlabus log of the index on Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (see 
table 3 legend). 
  T-stats are in square brackets. ** 95 percent significance with bootstrap standard 
errors, * 90 percent significance with bootstrap standard errors (percentile and bias 
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